Asurvo
Manufacturing

ISO and NIST coverage for industrial security programs.

Factories and industrial companies face both IT and OT security pressure. Asurvo gives you one framework-aware workspace for both.

Frameworks we cover

Relevant to your industry.

ISO 27001NIST CSFIEC 62443

Highlights

What matters for your industry.

OT/ICS control library
Supplier and vendor risk
Business continuity workflows

Industrial security

Security and compliance across the plant floor and the front office

For most manufacturers, the compliance driver is not a single regulator. It is a mix of customer requirements flowing down the supply chain, contract clauses from defense or automotive primes, insurers asking about ransomware resilience, and in some regions sector cybersecurity law. Underneath all of that is a technical reality: production networks that were once isolated are now connected to ERP, remote vendor support, and cloud analytics, so a phishing email in the office can stop a line.

Why OT needs its own approach

IT and OT priorities compared

IT and OT priorities compared
Top priorityConfidentiality and integrity of dataSafety and availability of the physical process
PatchingRegular cycles, often automatedConstrained by vendor certification and production downtime windows
Asset lifespanA few yearsOften decades, including unsupported operating systems
ScanningActive vulnerability scanning is routineActive scans can disrupt controllers; passive monitoring is usually preferred
Change ownershipIT operationsEngineering, maintenance, and equipment vendors

Those differences are why copying an IT control set onto the plant rarely works. Compensating controls, such as segmentation, application allowlisting, and tightly controlled remote access, often stand in for patching. Documenting that reasoning is as important as the control itself, because an auditor or customer will otherwise read an unpatched HMI as a failure rather than a managed risk.

Standards and obligations manufacturers encounter

Standard or regime, Issued or enforced by, Who it applies to, What it asks for comparison
ISA/IEC 62443 seriesISA and IEC (voluntary standard)Asset owners, system integrators, and product suppliers of industrial automation and control systemsA security program for the asset owner, risk assessment that divides systems into zones and conduits, target security levels, and secure development for suppliers
NIST CSF 2.0NIST (voluntary framework, released 2024)Any organization; widely used as a board-level program structureOutcomes across six functions: Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover
NIST SP 800-82 Rev 3NIST (guidance)Operators of OT environmentsGuidance on applying security controls and overlays to OT systems
CMMC 2.0 and NIST SP 800-171US Department of Defense through contract requirementsDefense suppliers handling Federal Contract Information or Controlled Unclassified InformationSafeguarding requirements verified by self-assessment, third-party assessment, or government assessment depending on level
NIS2 DirectiveEU member state authorities under national lawMedium and large entities in covered sectors, including manufacture of medical devices, electronics, machinery, and motor vehiclesCyber risk management measures, management accountability, and incident reporting
TISAXENX Association, using the VDA ISA catalogueSuppliers to automotive manufacturers that request itAn assessed information security level shared through the TISAX exchange

Zones, conduits, and where to draw lines

IEC 62443 asks you to group assets with similar security requirements into zones and to control every communication path between them, called conduits. In practice most teams start from a Purdue-style layering: enterprise IT at the top, a demilitarized zone for historians and patch servers, site operations, supervisory control, and basic control devices at the bottom. The first deliverable is usually a network diagram of those zones with every conduit listed, its owner, and what traffic it permits. That diagram then drives firewall rules, remote access design, and the scope of any assessment.

Defense suppliers and CMMC

  • Level 1 covers basic safeguarding of Federal Contract Information under FAR 52.204-21, with an annual self-assessment and affirmation.
  • Level 2 covers Controlled Unclassified Information and aligns with the 110 requirements of NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2. Depending on the contract, it is verified by self-assessment or by a certified third-party assessment organization every three years.
  • Level 3 adds selected requirements from NIST SP 800-172 and is assessed by the government, for suppliers of the most sensitive programs.
  • CMMC requirements are being phased into DoD contracts over several years, so primes are already flowing expectations down to their subcontractors. The CMMC framework page covers the levels in more depth.

Supplier risk runs in both directions

Manufacturers are both customers and suppliers. Upstream, equipment vendors and integrators often hold persistent remote access to production systems, and a compromised component supplier can halt output. Downstream, your own customers send questionnaires and contract clauses. A tiered approach, described in our vendor risk program guide, keeps effort proportional: deep review for vendors with OT access or single-source status, lighter review for everyone else.

Controls worth prioritizing for OT supplier access

  • Remote access through a managed jump host or secure access service, never direct inbound connections
  • Vendor accounts that are named, time-limited, and enabled only for the maintenance window
  • Session logging or recording for vendor sessions into control systems
  • Contract terms covering incident notification and vulnerability disclosure for supplied products
  • Alternate suppliers or spare parts identified for critical components

A realistic sequence and the pitfalls to avoid

  1. Build an asset inventory covering both IT and OT, including firmware versions and vendor support status.
  2. Use NIST CSF 2.0 to structure the program and report to leadership across both environments.
  3. Segment OT from IT and lock down remote access before investing in anything more advanced.
  4. Write and test a business continuity plan that assumes a ransomware event on the IT side forces OT to run isolated.
  5. Pursue ISO 27001 or CMMC where customers or contracts require it, and apply IEC 62443 practices to the plant.

In Asurvo, ISO 27001, NIST CSF 2.0, NIST SP 800-171, and CMMC 2.0 are available as live frameworks with automated cross-mapping, and teams can load their own internal control libraries or custom frameworks alongside them. Supplier inventory, tiering, and questionnaires run in the Third Party module, and continuity and incident plans sit in the policy center with review cycles.

FAQ

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between IEC 62443 and ISO 27001?

ISO 27001 defines a management system for information security across an organization, with a risk-based selection of controls. IEC 62443 is a series of standards written specifically for industrial automation and control systems, covering the asset owner's program, zone and conduit risk assessment, system security levels, and secure development requirements for product suppliers. Many manufacturers use ISO 27001 for the enterprise and IEC 62443 practices for the plant.

Does NIST CSF apply to manufacturers?

NIST CSF is voluntary and applies to any sector, including manufacturing. Version 2.0, released in 2024, added a Govern function and broadened its audience beyond critical infrastructure. It is useful as a common structure for describing security outcomes across IT and OT to executives, while more technical standards such as IEC 62443 and NIST SP 800-82 guide the OT implementation details.

Which manufacturers need CMMC?

CMMC applies to companies in the US defense industrial base that handle Federal Contract Information or Controlled Unclassified Information under Department of Defense contracts, including subcontractors further down the supply chain. The required level is set in the contract. Manufacturers that sell only commercial products to non-defense customers are generally not in scope, though primes may still ask for evidence of equivalent controls.

Can we run vulnerability scans on OT networks?

Be careful. Active scanning can crash or disrupt older controllers and field devices, so many OT teams rely on passive network monitoring and vendor advisories instead. Where active scanning is needed, agree the scope with engineering, test against non-production equipment first, and schedule it during a maintenance window. Document the approach so auditors understand why OT scanning differs from IT.

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